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Abstract
Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate signicantly more
from the Nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than when they are strate-
gic substitutes. This \strategic environment eect" oers promising insights into the aggregate
consequences of interactions among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, but its macroe-
conomic implications have been questioned because the underlying experiments involve a small
number of agents. We studied beauty contest games with a unique interior Nash equilibrium to
determine the critical group size for triggering the strategic environment eect. We show theo-
retically that the eect operates for interactions among three or more agents. Our experimental
results partially support this theory, showing a statistically signicant strategic environment ef-
fect for groups of ve or more agents. Our ndings establish that experiments involving a small
number of interacting agents can provide major insights into macro phenomena and bolster
previous work done on such issues as price dynamics.
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plementarity
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1 Introduction
To what extent does non-rational behavior by (some) individuals aect aggregate outcomes? This
question has regularly attracted the attention of leading scholars (see, for example, Becker, 1962;
Conlisk, 1996; Brock and Hommes, 1997; Fehr and Tyran, 2005, and references cited therein). More
recently, experimental and empirical research has shown that people do not behave as rationally as
often assumed in economic theory.1 This accumulated evidence has started to inuence theoretical
developments and there is now a rise in analyses based on \boundedly rational" agents in elds such
as game theory, industrial organization, and nance.2
Despite these developments, many economists are still skeptical about the usefulness of explicitly
considering the eects of bounded rationality when it comes to analyzing aggregate outcomes such
as macroeconomic phenomena. One of the reasons for this skepticism is the belief held by many
economists that can be summarized by an old statement from Gary Becker: \households may be
irrational and yet markets quite rational" (Becker, 1962, p.8). That is, the deviation from ratio-
nal behavior by many boundedly rational individuals will cancel each other out when we consider
aggregate phenomena, thus, bounded rationality at individual or household level does not matter
much at the aggregate level. Indeed, Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997) show that even experimental
markets consisting of zero-intelligence computer traders can exhibit high allocative eciency when
these zero-intelligence traders must operate under their respective budget constraints.
However, other theoretical studies have shown that the existence of a few boundedly rational
agents in a large population can have a larger-than-proportional impact on aggregate outcomes.
Akerlof and Yellen (1985a,b) and Russell and Thaler (1985), for example, show instances when the
existence of non-optimizing agents whose loss from non-optimization may be very small can still
have a large impact on equilibrium outcomes. De Long et al. (1990) show that irrational noisy
traders who take a large amount of risk can generate signicant mispricing in the asset market
and earn higher expected returns than rational investors. Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989,
1991) demonstrate that the behavior of boundedly rational agents can have a large, i.e., more then
proportional to their population share, inuence on the aggregate outcomes when the environment
1There are now many references for this including some very popular books such as Ariely (2008) and Kahneman
(2011). An early collection of so called \anomalies" in human behavior from the point of view of economic theory can
be found in Thaler (1992).
2For example, Camerer (2003) is a comprehensive summary of behavioral game theory, Shleifer (2000) is a nice
introduction to behavioral nance, and Spiegler (2011) provides an overview of the growth of this type of research in
the eld of industrial organization.
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is characterized by strategic complementarity.
In this paper, we follow up on the theoretical results from Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989,
1991). In these analyses, they considered two types of agents, naive and sophisticated, and they
showed that the aggregate outcome deviates more from the Nash or rational expectations equilibrium
in environments where agents' actions are strategic complements than in environments where they
are strategic substitutes. We call this phenomena \the strategic environment eect," a term that
will be used in the rest of the paper.
The underlying explanation for the strategic environment eect is the manner in which sophisti-
cated agents best respond to the way they believe naive agents behave. In the presence of strategic
complementarity, sophisticated agents have an incentive to mimic what they believe naive agents
will do and therefore amplify the deviations from the equilibrium caused by naive agents, while in
presence of strategic substitutability they have an incentive to act in the opposite way and thus
oset the deviations from the equilibrium caused by naive agents.
Several recent experiments provide support for the strategic environment eect in various con-
texts. Fehr and Tyran (2008) studied price dynamics after a nominal shock in price-setting games.
They found that the speed of adjustment to the new Nash equilibrium was much slower under
strategic complementarities than under strategic substitutabilities. Heemeijer et al. (2009) and Bao
et al. (2012) studied the strategic environment eect in the framework of \learning-to-forecast" ex-
periments (Hommes et al., 2005). In \learning-to-forecast" experiments, the subjects' task is to
repeatedly forecast the price of an asset with the knowledge that the forecasts, including their own,
determine the price they are forecasting. Although subjects are not informed of the exact relation-
ship between their forecasts and the resulting price, both Heemeijer et al. (2009) and Bao et al.
(2012) observed that the price forecasts and the resulting price both converge very quickly to the
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) price under strategic substitutability. In contrast, under
strategic complementarity, the forecasts and the resulting price often do not converge to the REE
price, but instead follow large oscillations and exhibit patterns that are reminiscent of bubbles and
crashes. Potters and Suetens (2009) considered the strategic environment eect on subjects' ability
to cooperate in an ecient but non-equilibrium outcome in duopoly games. They report signicantly
more cooperation under strategic complementarity than under strategic substitutability.
In a similar line of research, Sutan and Willinger (2009) experimentally studied two dierent one-
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shot beauty contest games (BCGs) with interior equilibria.3 In both experimental games, a group
of 8 subjects had to simultaneously choose a number between 0 and 100. In the game called BCG+
which involved strategic complementarity, the winner was the subject who chose the number closest
to 23 (mean+30) where mean is the average number chosen by all other subjects (excluding oneself)
of the group. In the second game called BCG , which involved strategic substitutability, the winner
was the one who chose the number closest to 100  23mean, where mean is dened identically. The
two games have the same unique Nash equilibrium: iterated elimination of dominated strategies
predicts that all players choose 60 in both games. However, Sutan and Willinger (2009) observed
signicantly more subjects in BCG  choosing numbers closer to 60 than in BCG+.4 Unlike the
above mentioned experiments, where subjects played the game repeatedly, subjects played a BCG
once in the experiments by Sutan and Willinger (2009). Their results, therefore, suggest that the
strategic environment eect operates when subjects are carrying out some kind of introspective
strategic reasoning.
While these experimental ndings quite convincingly document the existence of a strategic envi-
ronment eect, i.e. larger deviations of observed outcomes from the Nash or the rational expectations
equilibrium under strategic complementarity than under strategic substitutability, their robustness
as well as their implications for macro phenomena are often questioned because these experimental
results are based on interactions between a relatively small number of subjects. Indeed, as Duy
(2016) notes, \small numbers" is the most often raised concern when one tries to make inferences
about macroeconomic phenomena based on the results obtained from a laboratory experiment. In
the above-mentioned experimental studies, the sizes of groups were 2 in Potters and Suetens (2009),
4 in Fehr and Tyran (2008), 6 in Heemeijer et al. (2009) and Bao et al. (2012), and 8 in Sutan and
Willinger (2009). Because these studies also dier in many other respects, it is hard to obtain a
clear picture of what drives the main result, although all of them evoke what we have dened as the
strategic environment eect.
In order to better understand how the strategic environment eect operates, we designed a
novel experiment based on the hypothesis that the dierence in the observed deviation from the
3In a typical guessing or beauty contest game (Nagel, 1995; Ho et al., 1998), a group of players simultaneously
choose a number from within a given range, and the one who has chosen the number closest to p  mean, where
0 < p < 1 and mean is the mean of the numbers chosen by everyone, wins a xed prize. By changing the target
number to be pmean + c where 0 < c  100 and 0 < p < 1 or  1 < p < 0, one can obtain a beauty contest game
with an interior equilibrium. The rst to experimentally study a beauty contest game with an interior equilibrium
were Guth et al. (2002).
4Sutan and Willinger (2009) also study the version where mean is dened by the average number chosen by all
the subjects in the group including oneself. The main result of the paper, however, is robust against this change.
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equilibrium prediction between two strategic environments is dependent on the size of the group of
players. The intuition behind such a population size eect is rather simple. Recall that the sources
of the strategic environment eect are the existence of agents who are heterogeneous in their degree
of strategic sophistication and the manner in which more sophisticated subjects best-respond to
the way they believe their less sophisticated counterparts will behave. In the presence of strategic
substitutability of actions, the average behavior of less sophisticated agents (who are heterogeneous
in their depth of strategic thinking among themselves) will not deviate much from the equilibrium,
while it will in the presence of strategic complementarity of actions. However, for this reasoning to
operate, the size of the group needs to be large enough so that more sophisticated players can safely
consider an \average behavior" of their less sophisticated counterparts.
Thus, by systematically varying population size, we theoretically and experimentally study the
two versions of the one-shot beauty contest game with interior equilibria, BCG+ and BCG ,
that were previously studied by Sutan and Willinger (2009). We focus on beauty contest games
because this class of games has been an important tool in the development of behavioral game
theory (Camerer, 2003), in particular models that incorporate heterogeneity in depth of strategic
thinking among players, such as the level-K (Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Nagel, 1995) and the cognitive
hierarchy (CH) model (Camerer et al., 2004). In addition, a beauty contest game can be seen
as a canonical model of strategic thinking in speculative markets as rst brought to the attention
of economists by Keynes (1936, Ch.12).5 Furthermore, the more complex setups implemented in
dynamic \learning-to-forecast" experiments mentioned above (Hommes et al., 2005; Heemeijer et al.,
2009; Bao et al., 2012) essentially boil down to a version of repeated beauty contest games with noise
in which subjects are not informed about exactly how the target is dened (Sonnemans and Tuinstra,
2010). Finally, given the constant sum nature of beauty contest games, we can abstract away from
issues related to subjects trying to coordinate on a Pareto-ecient outcome, which has been studied
in the context of oligopoly games by Huck et al. (2004), Potters and Suetens (2009), and Friedman
et al. (2015) among others.
Our main hypothesis, which is set forth in Section 2, is as follows: When the population size is
small, the strategic environment eect will be weak or non-existent. However, the strategic environ-
5Keynes conceived a beauty contest as an inspiring illustration of the behavior at work within the stock market:
smart traders do not try to guess what the fundamental value of a stock is, but rather what every other trader believes
it is, and even smarter traders try to predict what the smart traders believe others believe about the fundamental
value, and so on. The implication is that asset prices are not directly related to their fundamental values but to
the rst kth-order distribution of beliefs about what others believe, where k is the deepest level of thinking in the
population of traders.
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ment eect becomes signicant if the size of the population is large enough.
Based on our experiment involving more than 1000 subjects, we nd a signicant strategic envi-
ronment eect for groups of 5 or more, but not for groups of smaller sizes. More precisely, in groups
of 5 or more we observe a larger deviation from the Nash equilibrium prediction under BCG+ than
under BCG , but not in smaller size groups. Our experimental test of the strategic environment
eect is quite strong because it allows for both between-subject and within-subject comparisons.
Therefore, the impact of the strategic environment eect on outcomes that was reported in earlier
experiments involving relatively small group sizes is robust against an increase in group size but not
against a decrease.
Our ndings support the fact that experimental results, even if they are based on a relatively
small number of interacting players, can provide major insights into macro phenomena. This bolsters
work done in earlier studies on such issues as price dynamics observed in nancial markets (Hommes
et al., 2005; Heemeijer et al., 2009; Bao et al., 2012) and nominal rigidity (Fehr and Tyran, 2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 establishes the main hypothesis that
will be tested in this paper; Section 3 describes the experimental design; Section 4 summarizes the
results of the experiment; and Section 5 oers a summary and concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical predictions
In this section, we will outline how our main hypotheses were derived. We rst consider the level-K
model (Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Nagel, 1995) and the cognitive hierarchy (CH) model (Camerer et al.,
2004), which will be later extended to allow for imperfect best response a la the noisy introspection
model (Goeree and Holt, 2004) and the truncated heterogeneous quantal response model (Rogers
et al., 2009).
In the beauty contest game (BCG) n players (n  2) simultaneously choose a number between 0
and 100. The player whose chosen number is closest to the target number wins a prize. In the case
of a tie, one of the winners is randomly selected to receive the prize. We consider two variants of
the game, BCG+ and BCG . In BCG+, the players' actions are strategic complements whereas
in BCG  their actions are strategic substitutes. In order to equalize the slopes of the best response
functions in both games, and to avoid any inuence of players' choices on the target number, we
set the target as the average number chosen by all players in the group excluding a player's own
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choice.6 Namely, in BCG+, the target for player i, T iBCG+, is dened as
T iBCG+ = 20 +
2
3
P
j 6=i aj
n  1 : (1)
where aj is an integer chosen by player j. Similarly, the target for player i in BCG , T iBCG , is
dened as
T iBCG  = 100 
2
3
P
j 6=i aj
n  1 : (2)
The unique Nash equilibrium in both games is that all players choose 60. The Nash equilibrium
neither depends on the nature of the strategic environment nor on the number of players.7
2.1 Level-K and cognitive hierarchy models
Alternative predictions are obtained if the following two assumptions are relaxed: (i) all players
have innite depth of reasoning; and (ii) this fact is common knowledge. Two well-known models
incorporate heterogeneity in depth-of-strategic thinking among players: the level-K model (Stahl
and Wilson, 1994; Nagel, 1995), and the cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004).
Table 1 reports the dierent predictions for these two models in a specic case. We report what
the level-K and the Poisson CH model predict, in terms of both the number chosen and its absolute
deviation from Nash equilibrium, for each level of player for BCG+ and BCG .8 For both models,
we assume that sophisticated players (i.e. k > 1) believe that level-0s randomly choose a number
from [0; 100] with uniform probability, which implies that the average choice made by level-0s is
equal to 50. For the Poisson CH model, we furthermore assume that the mean depth of strategic
thinking is equal to 2. As one can see from the left panel of the table, the level-K model predicts
the same magnitude of absolute deviations from the Nash prediction in BCG+ and BCG  for all
the considered levels of k. In contrast, the Poisson CH model predicts a smaller deviation from the
6Thus, in the case of 2-player games, the target number depends simply on the number chosen by the opponent.
See Appendix A for details.
7 Our explanation of the target number in the instructions given to subjects for the BCG+ game, which is
20 + 2
3
P
j 6=i aj
n 1 is dierent from the one used by Sutan and Willinger (2009), i.e.,
2
3
P
j 6=i aj
n 1 + 30

. We made this
change to make the explanations of the target number in BCG+ and BCG  as symmetrical as possible. In addition,
in our experiment, one of the winners was chosen randomly in the case of a tie, while in Sutan and Willinger (2009),
winners received an equal share of the prize. This change was made to avoid the possibility that might especially arise
in n = 2 games that two subjects opt to choose a focal number to share the prize between them.
8In the Poisson CH model, the frequencies of players with various levels (0, 1, 2, ...) in the population is assumed
to follow a Poisson distribution.
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Table 1: Choices and their absolute deviation from equilibrium predicted by level-K model and
Poisson cognitive hierarchy model (with the mean depth of thinking being 2).
Level-K Cognitive hierarchy model
Game k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4
BCG+ x 53.33 55.56 57.04 58.02
jx  60j 6.67 4.44 2.96 1.98
BCG  x 66.67 55.56 62.96 58.02
jx  60j 6.67 4.44 2.96 1.98
Game k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4
BCG+ x 53.33 54.81 55.51 55.82
jx  60j 6.67 5.19 4.49 4.18
BCG  x 66.67 59.26 69.75 59.84
jx  60j 6.67 0.74 0.25 0.16
Nash prediction for BCG  for level-2 and above.9
The dierence in predictions between the level-K model and the Poisson CH model is due to the
fact that in the CH model, a player of level k best responds to the weighted average of choices made
by players of lower levels, i.e. between 0 and k   1. Consider for instance a level-2 player. In an
environment where players' choices are strategic substitutes (BCG ), the average choices made by
level-0 and level-1 are on the opposite side of the Nash equilibrium: average choices by level-0s are
below and average choices by level-1s are above the equilibrium in the example shown in Table 1.
Best responding to the weighted average of these numbers essentially leads level-2 players to best
respond to a number that is close to the Nash equilibrium, because in BCG  the deviations from
the Nash equilibrium of the choices made by level-0 players and level-1 players cancel each other out.
In contrast, when players' choices are strategic complements (BCG+), choices made by lower levels
are on the same side of the equilibrium (e.g. below the equilibrium level in the above example),
and therefore cancelation of deviations by lower level players does not occur. Note that this logic
does not operate in the level-K model because level-2 players are only best responding to the choices
made by level-1 players. The insight gained from the CH model is essentially the same as the one
oered by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) in their two-type model, but here the logic has been
extended to include more types.
If the cancellation of deviations by lower levels is indeed the main driving force behind the
convergence of choices towards the equilibrium under strategic substitutability, such a force is less
likely to operate when the number of players is small. For instance, if only two players are involved in
the game, a level-2 player may simply assume that the opponent is a level-0 player and best respond
9This dierence between the prediction of the level-K and the CH models is robust, at least qualitatively, against
change in the belief about the behavior of level-0 players and the Poisson parameter in the CH model, except when
level-0 players are assumed to choose 60 on average.
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to this assumption instead of best responding against a (weighted) average of choices expected from
a large number of lower-level players.
2.2 Allowing noisy best responses
The level-K and the CH models, however, are based on the strong assumption of perfect best response,
i.e., each player chooses a number that is a best response to his or her belief about the average of
others' choices.10 Relaxing the perfect best response assumption leads to the consideration of weaker
forms of best response in which players' choices depend proportionally on their expected payos:
options with higher expected payos are chosen with higher probabilities. It has been shown that
models that rely on imperfect best response, or so-called \better response" assumptions (Rogers
et al., 2009), provide a more suitable t to the experimental outcomes than models assuming perfect
best response (see, among others, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Goeree and Holt, 2001; Rogers
et al., 2009; Breitmoser, 2012). The assumption of perfect best response in level-K and CH models
has therefore been relaxed in favor of the assumption of \better response" in the noisy introspection
(Goeree and Holt, 2004) and the truncated heterogeneous quantal response (Rogers et al., 2009)
models, respectively. Indeed, Goeree et al. (2014) showed that the noisy introspection model predicts
the experimental outcomes much better than the level-K model in games that extend the 11-20
Money Request Game proposed by Arad and Rubinstein (2012). Similarly, Breitmoser (2012) showed
that the noisy introspection model ts better the data of the beauty contest experiments compiled
by Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002) than the level-K model.
Let us check whether the insight we have gained from analysis of the level-K and the Poisson
CH models is robust against the introduction of imperfect best response by considering a logistic
level-K (LLK) model and a logistic cognitive hierarchy (LCH) model. Both the LLK and the LCH
models assume that: (i) players are heterogeneous in their depth of strategic thinking; and (ii) they
do not perfectly best respond to their beliefs about choices of others. The dierence between the
two models is similar to the one between the level-K model and the CH model. In the LLK model,
a level-k player believes that everyone else is of level-(k   1). In LCH, on the other hand, a level-k
player assumes that others are of a lower level, i.e., between level-0 and level-(k 1). In this section,
for the LCH model we assume that players of each level believe that others are distributed according
10However, Breitmoser (2012) showed that choosing the dened target number based on the average choices of
others is generally not a best response against opponents who are randomizing in beauty contest games.
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to the (truncated) Poisson distribution just as in the CH model.11
In order to facilitate the presentation and numerical computations of the LLK and LCH models,
we assume that players (in BCG+ and BCG ) can only choose integer numbers between 0 and
100.
In both models, a level-0 player chooses an integer between 0 and 100 with uniform probability.
Level-1 players assume that level-0 players choose randomly with uniform probability and compute
the expected payo for each of the integers between 0 and 100. Let E1((a)) be the expected payo
for a level-1 player if he or she chooses integer a. Then, the level-1 player chooses an integer s
according to the probability
P i1(s) =
e1E1((s))P
a e
1E1((a))
(3)
where 1 is a parameter that governs the sensitivity of level-1 players' choices to the variation in their
expected payos. If 1 = 0 the level-1 player chooses just like a level-0 player, i.e., P
i
1(s) = 1=101
whatever the number s considered. If 1 !1 the probability distribution becomes degenerate and
players select the integer with the highest expected payo with probability one like in the level-K
or the CH models, i.e., players tend to perfect best reply.
The dierence in beliefs about others' choices between the LLK model and the LCH model aects
players' choice for level-2 and above (k  2). Let us consider the LLK model rst. A level-k player
believes that all other players are of level-(k   1), and level-(k   1) believes that all others are of
level-(k   2), etc. Thus, for example, a level-2 player computes the expected payo of choosing an
integer a, ELLK2 ((a)), based on the assumption that others will choose a number, s, according to
the probability P j1 (s) dened in Eq. 3. Given the expected payo E
LLK
2 ((a)), the level-2 player i
chooses integer l according to the probability
P i;LLK2 (l) =
e2E
LLK
2 ((l))P
s e
2ELLK2 ((s))
: (4)
For players with a higher value of k, the choice probabilities are dened similarly in an iterative
manner. The sensitivity of choices to the expected payos, k, can dier across various ks.
12
11Our LLK and LCH models are very closely related to the noisy introspection model proposed by Goeree and Holt
(2004) and the truncated heterogeneous quantal response model proposed by Rogers et al. (2009), respectively. Our
LLK and LCH models dier from these two models in the way the sensitivity of the choices to the expected payos
are modeled across dierent levels.
12For example, in the noisy introspection(Goeree and Holt, 2004) or the truncated heterogeneous quantal response
model (Rogers et al., 2009), k increases by factor  for each k.
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However, in our analyses below, we will assume k =  > 0 for all k > 0.
Let us turn now to the LCH model. A level-k (k  2) player believes that others are of a lower
level, between level-0 and level-(k   1). Let pr(k) be the probability for a player to be of level-k.
Just as in the Poisson CH model, we assume that pr(k) follows a Poisson distribution. In the LCH
model, a level-2 player believes the others are either level-0 or level-1, with probability pr(0)pr(0)+pr(1)
and pr(1)pr(0)+pr(1) , respectively. Similarly, a level-3 player thinks that others are either of level-0, -1,
or -2 with probabilities pr(0)P2
j=0 pr(j)
, pr(1)P2
j=0 pr(j)
, and pr(2)P2
j=0 pr(j)
, respectively. For higher levels, their
beliefs about others' levels are dened in a similar fashion.
When computing the expected payo of choosing an integer a, a level-2 player takes this (trun-
cated) distribution of others' levels into account. Namely, the level-2 player considers the proba-
bility of each of his or her opponents being level-0 and level-1, with respective choice probabilities
P j0 (s) = 1=101 and P
j
1 (s) dened in Eq. 3 above. Given such computed expected payos for each a,
ELCH2 ((a)), the level-2 player chooses integer l with probability
P i;LCH2 (l) =
e2E
LCH
2 ((s))P
a e
2ELCH2 ((a))
(5)
The probability of choosing an integer for level-3 and above is dened iteratively in a similar manner.
Figures 1 to 4 show the numerical results for the LLK and the LCH models for n 2 f2; 3; 4; 5g.
In generating these gures, we assume k = 5:0 for all k for both models. For LCH models, we also
assume that the players' levels follow the Poisson distribution with the mean level equal to 2. In
Figures 1 and 2, the choice probabilities for each integer, PLLKk (a) and P
LCH
k (a), respectively, for
level-1, -2, and -3 players are shown for each n. In Figures 3 and 4, the cumulative distributions of
the absolute deviations of choices from the Nash equilibrium prediction (60) are shown for level-1,
-2, and -3 for each n for LLK and LCH, respectively. In all the gures, the outcome for BCG+ is
shown in dashed line while that for BCG  is shown in solid line. Note that for a level-1 player, the
LLK and the LCH predictions are the same.
The rst row, which corresponds to n = 2 in all gures, exhibits only one distribution in each
panel, because the outcomes for BCG  and BCG+ are identical for levels 1, 2, and 3. This conrms
our insights based on the level-K and the CH models discussed above. In groups of size n = 2, we
do not expect to observe a dierence in the deviation from the Nash equilibrium between BCG 
and BCG+.
11
n = 2
K = 1 K = 2 K = 3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
n = 3
K = 1 K = 2 K = 3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
n = 4
K = 1 K = 2 K = 3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
n = 5
K = 1 K = 2 K = 3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
x
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
pr
Figure 1: Probabilities for players with level-1, -2, and -3 choosing each integer in [0; 100] in BCGn 
and BCGn+ according to the logit-level-K (LLK) model for n 2 f2; 3; 4; 5g. Outcomes for BCGn 
and BCGn+ are shown in solid line and in dashed line, respectively. Note that outcomes for BCG2 
and BCG2+ are exactly the same. For all the models, we assume k = 5 for all k.
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Figure 2: Probabilities for players with level-1, -2, and -3 choosing each integer in [0; 100] in BCGn 
and BCGn+ according to the logit-cognitive-hierarchy (LCH) models for n 2 f2; 3; 4; 5g. Outcomes
for BCGn  and BCGn+ are shown in solid line and in dashed line, respectively. Note that outcomes
for BCG2  and BCG2+ are exactly the same. For all the models, we assume k = 5 for all k. We
assume the underlying distribution of levels follow the Poisson distribution with mean k = 2.
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of the absolute deviation of the choice from the Nash equilibrium
prediction (60) for players with level-1, -2, and -3 in BCGn  and BCGn+ according to the logit-
level-K (LLK) model for n 2 f2; 3; 4; 5g. Outcomes for BCGn  and BCGn+ are shown in solid
line and in dashed line, respectively. Note that outcomes for BCG2  and BCG2+ are exactly the
same. For all the models, we assume k = 5 for all k.
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of the absolute deviation of the choice from the Nash equilibrium
prediction (60) for players with level-1, -2, and -3 in BCGn  and BCGn+ according to the logit-
cognitive-hierarchy (LCH) models for n 2 f2; 3; 4; 5g. Outcomes for BCGn  and BCGn+ are
shown in solid line and in dashed line, respectively. Note that outcomes for BCG2  and BCG2+
are exactly the same. For all the models, we assume k = 5 for all k. We assume the underlying
distribution of levels follow the Poisson distribution with mean k = 2.
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For the larger groups (n > 2) shown in the remaining rows of Figure 1 to 4, the outcomes dier
between BCG  and BCG+. In particular, one observes that the cumulative distribution of the
absolute deviations of choices from 60 (shown in Figures 3 and 4) in BCG  lies on the left of that
in BCG+ for all levels 1, 2, and 3 in both the LLK and the LCH models.
This leads to the main hypothesis to be tested in our experiments:
Hypothesis 1 The deviation of the choices from the Nash equilibrium is the same for BCG+ and
BCG  when n = 2, and will be larger in BCG+ than in BCG  for n > 2.
Because it is not certain our experiments will result in such a clear-cut result with respect to n,
we also put forward a weaker hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The deviation of the choices from the Nash equilibrium is not signicantly dierent
between BCG+ and BCG  when n is small, but becomes larger in BCG+ than in BCG  when n
is big enough.
The purpose of Hypothesis 2 is to identify the critical n that distinguishes small groups from
large groups. Therefore, in addition to conducting an experiment for n = 2 and n = 3 (to test
Hypothesis 1), we systematically vary n in order to empirically determine the critical value of n.
Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) and Chou et al. (2009) studied a 2-player BCG for which the target
number was 23mean.
13 This 2-player BCG has a special feature that \whoever chooses the lower
number wins." Therefore, it is relatively easy to realize the existence of a dominant strategy in this
game, i.e., to choose zero. Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) report, however, that despite this special
feature about 90% of their subjects chose numbers larger than zero, thereby not realizing the special
feature of the game (Chou et al., 2009). In addition, Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) found that the
numbers chosen in their 2-player BCG are larger than the numbers chosen by subjects who were
involved in BCG games with groups of size n > 3. According to Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) their
result could be due to the fact that subjects tend to ignore the strength of the inuence of their
chosen number on the mean and thus on the target number. In our 2-player BCGs, unlike the one
studied by Grosskopf and Nagel (2008), there is no obvious way of winning. In addition, the target
for a subject is not inuenced by his or her own choice. Thus, we believe the mechanism that we
have outlined in this section, namely the diculty of determining the average across choices among
13Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) also studied 2-player BCGs. But most of the games they studied are asym-
metric in that the strategy sets and/or the target numbers for two players diered.
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less sophisticated players when the group size is small, is the main eect that drives the results of
our experiment.
3 Experimental design
As noted in the previous section, we consider two beauty contest games, BCG+ and BCG , while
varying the size of the group n. We denote BCG+ and BCG  games with group size of n by
BCGn+ and BCGn , respectively. In order to test Hypothesis 2, we systematically vary the group
size n and consider n 2 f2; 3; 4; 5; 6g. We also consider n 2 f8; 16g to check whether the result of
Sutan and Willinger (2009) is robust against the small dierences in experimental design between
our experiment and their experiment discussed in Footnote 7 (n = 8), as well as to check whether our
results continue to hold when the group size becomes even larger (n = 16). In our experiment, each
subject chooses an integer between 0 and 100 and the subject whose choice is closest to the target
number wins a xed prize (8 euros). In case of a tie, as described in the previous section, one of the
winners will be chosen at random to receive the money. We have opted to restrict the choice set to
integers between 0 and 100, instead of real numbers, in order to make our experimental observations
comparable to the predictions of the LLK and LCH models discussed in Section 2. Furthermore,
because only a few subjects chose non-integers in Sutan and Willinger (2009), we expected that this
restriction would not greatly inuence the results.
In each experimental session, subjects play both BCGn+ and BCGn  with the same n. In half
of the sessions, subjects play BCGn+ rst, and in the other half, they play BCGn  rst. Subjects
were informed that they will play two games, called Game 1 and Game 2, but they were not informed
about the nature of Game 2 when playing Game 1. Furthermore, no feedback regarding the outcome
of Game 1 was provided before playing Game 2. At the end of Game 2, one of the two games was
chosen randomly for the payment. See the Appendix C for the English translation of the instructions
that were provided to subjects in our experiment.
4 Results
Subjects were recruited from across the campus of the Burgundy School of Business between Septem-
ber and November 2015. In total, 1153 student subjects were involved in our experiment. Each
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Table 2: Summary of treatments
Group Size Number of Subjects in Number of Subjects in
BCG  ! BCG+ BCG+! BCG 
2 100 92
3 90 90
4 100 92
5 70 75
6 66 66
8 96 88
16 64 64
subject participated in only one experimental session. On average, a session lasted for about 30
minutes. Experiments were not computerized and were carried out with papers and pens. Table 2
summarizes the number of subjects involved in each treatment.
4.1 Between subjects analyses
We start with a comparison of the subjects' choices for Game 1 in order to derive between-subjects
results. Figure 5 shows the empirical cumulative distribution (ECD) of chosen numbers and their
absolute deviation from the Nash equilibrium choice for BCGn  (in solid lines) and BCGn+ (in
dashed lines) for all the tested values of n.14 The p-value below each panel is based on a two-sample
permutation test (two-tailed).15
One can easily see from Figure 5 that for small group sizes, i.e. for n 2 f2; 3; 4g, the absolute
deviation of the chosen numbers from the equilibrium prediction (jx 60j) does not signicantly dier
between BCGn+ and BCGn . The dierence however becomes signicant for larger group sizes,
i.e., n 2 f5; 6; 8; 16g. While the ratios of the median absolute deviation of the chosen numbers from
60 in BCG+ to that in BCG  are 0.97, 1.25, and 1.08 in n 2 f2; 3; 4g, respectively, they become
1.74, 2.88, 3.00, and 2.21 for n 2 f5; 6; 8; 16g, respectively. These results give partial support to our
hypotheses. Namely, we state:
Observation 1 (between subjects): Our data reject Hypothesis 1 but accept Hypothesis 2. The
deviations of the choices from the Nash equilibrium are not signicantly dierent between BCGn+
and BCGn  for n < 5, but for n  5 it is signicantly larger in BCGn+ than in BCGn .
14Figure 7 in the Appendix shows the histogram of chosen numbers in BCGn  and BCGn+ for all values of n.
15The permutation tests are conducted using the STATA package provided by Kaiser (2007).
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Figure 5: The empirical cumulative distribution of chosen numbers x and their absolute deviations
from the Nash equilibrium predictions jx  60j for BCGn+ (dashed) and BCGn  (solid).
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4.2 Within subject analyses
We now consider the choices made by each subject in the two BCGs. Our subjects played both
BCGn+ and BCGn  with the same group size n for each game. Some of our subjects played
BCGn+ rst and then BCGn , while others played in the opposite order. We are primarily
interested in whether the absolute deviations of the chosen numbers from the Nash equilibrium (60)
are larger in BCGn+ than in BCGn , within subjects. Thus, for each subject i we dene
ijx  60j  jxiBCG+   60j   jxiBCG    60j
where xiBCG+ (x
i
BCG ) is the number subject i has chosen in BCGn+ (BCGn ). ijx  60j is the
dierence in the absolute dierence between the numbers subject i has chosen and 60 in BCGn+
and BCGn .
According to Hypothesis 1, ijx   60j should not dier signicantly from zero for n = 2, but
should for n  2. Under Hypothesis 2, ijx  60j should not be signicantly dierent from zero for
small values of n, but should be so for large enough values of n.
The results are summarized in Figure 6. The gure shows the empirical cumulative distribution
(ECD) of the jx  60j separately for those subjects who played BCGn+ rst (in solid black) and
those who played BCGn  rst (in dashed gray). The p-values reported under the ECD plots are
based on paired permutation test with the null hypothesis that jxiBCG+   60j = jxiBCG    60j.
We obtain similar results for the within-subject analysis as those found for the between-subjects
analyses. We fail to reject the null hypotheses that jxiBCG+   60j = jxiBCG    60j for group sizes
n  4,16 but we reject the null hypothesis for n  5. Thus, regardless of the order in which subjects
played the two BCGs, subjects tended to deviate more from the Nash prediction in BCGn+ than
in BCGn  for large groups (n  5), but not for small groups (2  n < 5). We summarize this as
follows:
Observation 2 (within subjects): Our data reject Hypothesis 1 but accept Hypothesis 2. For
n  5, deviations of the choices from the Nash equilibrium are signicantly larger in BCGn+
compared to BCGn , but for n < 5 they are not.
16Except for those who played BCG3+ rst. In this particular case, we rejected jxiBCG+   60j = jxiBCG    60j in
the opposite direction. Namely, jxiBCG    60j was signicantly larger than jxiBCG+   60j. Note, however, if we had
taken a one-tailed test, because our theory suggests to test H0 : jxiBCG+ 60j  jxiBCG  60j vs H1 : jxiBCG+ 60j >
jxiBCG    60j, we have not rejected the null hypothesis.
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Figure 6: Empirical cumulative distribution (ECD) of j60   xj. jx   60j  jxBCG+   60j  
jxBCG    60j. BCGn+ ! BCGn  sessions are shown in solid black and BCGn  ! BCGn+
are shown in dashed gray. P-values are based on the paired permutation test (two-tailed). H0 is
jxBCG+   60j = jxBCG    60j.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
We use the term \the strategic environment eect" to refer to the tendency of agents to deviate
signicantly more from the Nash or rational expectations equilibrium when their actions are strategic
complements than when they are strategic substitutes.
Its existence has been shown theoretically by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989, 1991),
and later conrmed experimentally by Fehr and Tyran (2008), Heemeijer et al. (2009), Potters and
Suetens (2009), and Sutan and Willinger (2009).
The strategic environment eect provides promising insights into the aggregate consequences
of interaction among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, but its macroeconomic relevance
has been often questioned because the above-mentioned experiments involved groups with a small
number of interacting agents. This criticism has led to our research questions: Does the strategic
environment eect depend on population size? If so, how?
As it is useful to provide robust experimental evidence about the relevance of the strategic
environment eect for addressing macro phenomena, we investigated this question experimentally
by studying variants of the beauty contest game that have the same unique interior solution, and by
systematically varying the size of the group of interacting subjects. The two dierent beauty contest
games we have considered involved either strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Both games
are dominance solvable and have the same interior equilibrium that is reached after the same number
of iterated eliminations of weakly dominated strategies. We have considered seven dierent group
sizes: n 2 f2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 8; 16g. In all games, the n subjects simultaneously chose an integer between
0 and 100. The winner is the subject who has chosen the number closest to the target. Under
strategic complementarity, BCG+, the winning number for player i was dened as 20 + 23mean i.
Under strategic substitutability, BCG , the target for player i was set as 100   23mean i where
mean i is the average of the numbers chosen by all players in the group except player i. The two
games have the same Nash equilibrium, everyone choosing 60. The logit-level-K (LLK) and logit-
cognitive-hierarchy (LCH) models predict that the deviation of the chosen number from the Nash
equilibrium is larger in BCG+ than in BCG  for n > 2.
We found that deviations from the Nash equilibrium prediction are larger in a statistically sig-
nicant manner in BCG+ games than in BCG  games when the group size exceeds n  5. But
such a dierence is not observed for smaller-sized groups (n < 5). The ratio of the median absolute
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deviation of the chosen number from the Nash equilibrium in BCG+ to that in BCG  is close to
one for n < 5, while it is more than two for n > 5.
Our ndings establish the critical threshold required for population size to trigger the strategic
environment eect and provide new evidence that experiments involving a small number of inter-
acting agents can provide major insights into macro phenomena. Our results also support earlier
experimental ndings about the equilibrating force of strategic substitutes in contrast to strategic
complements which tend to amplify deviations. However, the equilibrating force of the strategic
substitutability operates properly only if the size of the group is large enough, i.e. n  5 in our
experimental setting. The reason is that under strategic substitutability, outcomes are closer to the
Nash equilibrium prediction only if more-sophisticated players can safely average the numbers chosen
by the other less-sophisticated players when selecting their own number. The self-correcting force at
work at the aggregate level under strategic substitutability is absent under strategic complementar-
ity, thus giving rise to larger deviations. However, even under strategic substitutability, a minimum
group size is required for averaging. In the simple beauty contest games that we have considered, we
found that a group of ve subjects is enough to observe a signicant strategic environment eect.
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A The denition of the target and the slope of the best re-
sponse functions
Let's consider BCGn+ and BCGn  where the winner is the one closer to the following target based
on the mean including the player. That is for BCGn+, the target, T , is
T = 20 +
2
3
P
j xj
n
and for BCGn , it is
T = 100  2
3
P
j xj
n
where xj is the number chosen by subject j in the same group.
Ignoring the inequality of the winning condition, a bit of algebra will lead us to have the following
best response functions. In BCGn+
x(x i) =
60n
3n  2 +
2n  2
3n  2
P
j 6=i xj
n  1
and in BCGn 
x(x i) =
300n
3n+ 2
  2n  2
3n+ 2
P
j 6=i xj
n  1
Here if n!1 then, we have 2n 23n 2 = 2n 23n+2 = 23 so that the slope of the best response functions
will be the same between BCGn+ and BCGn , but with a small group size n, they are quite
dierent. For any n, the absolute value of the slope is smaller in BCGn  than in BCGn+.
Thus, to be able to study the eect of the group size n, as well as the dierence in the nature
of the strategic interaction between BCGn+ and BCGn  without them inuencing the slope of
the best response functions, one needs to dene the target based on the average choice by the other
players in the group as we have done in this paper.
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B Histogram of numbers chosen
n=2 n=3
BCG2  BCG2+ BCG3  BCG3+
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
n=4 n=5
BCG4  BCG4+ BCG5  BCG5+
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
n=6 n=8
BCG6  BCG6+ BCG8  BCG8+
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
n=16
BCG16  BCG16+
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
0 20 40 60 80 100
x0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
PDF
Figure 7: Histogram of numbers chosen by subjects in BCGn  and BCGn+ for various group size
n. Here we consider only the rst game each subject played.
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C Instructions
This section of the appendix presents an English translation of the instructions used in our experi-
ment with n = 4 where BCG+4 was played before BCG 4. The other treatments are dierent from
the one presented in terms of the the number of players in the room and the examples shown. We
have taken a particular care to give isomorphic examples for all values of n. The examples shown
in various treatments are summarized at the end of this section.
General rule
This is an experiment about decision making.
You will play two games. Instructions for the second game will be given to you after you nish
playing the rst game.
This experiment allows you to earn real money. The payment rule is explained in each game.
One of the two games will be randomly selected at the end of the experiment and your payments
in that game will be given to you.
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Game 1
You interact with 3 other randomly selected people in this room.
You have to choose an integer between 0 and 100. The other 3 persons will also do the same. The
rule to earn money is the following: the person choosing the number closest to his or her TARGET
will earn 8 euros, the others will earn 0. If the numbers chosen by several persons are equally close
to their own TARGETS, one of them will be randomly chosen to earn the 8 euros.
The TARGET for you is dened as follows:
TARGET = 20 +
2
3
(average of the numbers chosen by the 3 other persons)
Example : You choose 3 and the 3 other persons choose 0, 1, 2. The TARGETs and the dierences
to the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 20 + 23 [(0 + 1 + 2)=3] = 20.66 20.66-3 = 17.66
The lowest
Player with choice 0 20 + 23 [(1 + 2 + 3)=3] = 21.33 21.33-0=21.33
Player with choice 1 20 + 23 [(0 + 2 + 3)=3]= 21.11 21.11-1=20.11
Player with choice 2 20 + 23 [(0 + 1 + 3)=3]= 20.88 20.88-2=18.88
You win because the dierence between the number you chose and your TARGET is the lowest.
When everybody has made his/her choice, the choices will be randomly divided into groups of 4
and the winners will be determined. The result will be communicated to you after you play Game
2 (and you will be able to take your money if you won). Good luck!
Your choice (between 0 and 100):
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Game 2
Now you still interact with three randomly selected people in this room, but the TARGET is
dierent.
You have to choose an integer between 0 and 100. The other 3 persons will do the same. The
rule to earn money is the following: the person choosing the number closest to his or her TARGET
will earn 8 euros, the others will earn 0. If the numbers chosen by several persons are equally close
to their own TARGETS, one of them will be randomly chosen to earn the 8 euros.
The TARGET for you is dened as follows:
TARGET = 100  2
3
(average of the numbers chosen by the 3 other persons)
Example : You choose 3 and the 3 other persons choose 0, 1, 2. The TARGETs and the dierences
to the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 100  23 [(0 + 1 + 2)=3] = 99.33 99.33-3 = 96.33
The lowest
Player with choice 0 100  23 [(1 + 2 + 3)=3] = 98.66 98.66-0=98.66
Player with choice 1 100  23 [(0 + 2 + 3)=3]= 98.88 98.88-1=97.88
Player with choice 2 100  23 [(0 + 1 + 3)=3]= 99.11 99.11-2=97.11
You win because the dierence between the number you chose and your TARGET is the lowest.
When everybody has made his/her choice, the choices will be randomly divided into groups of
4 and the winners will be determined (and you will be able to take your money if you won). Good
luck!
Your choice (between 0 and 100):
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C.1 Examples used in other treatments
BCG+2: You choose 2 and the other person chooses 0. The TARGETs and the dierences to the
TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 2) 20 + 230 = 20 20-2 = 18
The lowest
Player with choice 0 20 + 232= 21.33 21.33-0=21.33
BCG 2: You choose 2 and the other person chooses 1. The TARGETs and the dierences to the
TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 2) 100  231 = 99.33 99.33-2 = 97.33
The lowest
Player with choice 1 100  232= 98.66 98.66-1=97.66
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BCG+3: You choose 3 and the other two people both choose 1. The TARGETs and the dierences
to the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 20 + 23 [(1 + 1)=2] = 20.66 20.66-3 = 17.66
The lowest
Player with choice 1 20 + 23 [(1 + 3)=2]= 21.33 21.33-1=20.33
BCG 3: You choose 3 and the other two people both choose 1. The TARGETs and the dierences
to the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 100  23 [(1 + 1)=2] = 99.33 99.33-3 = 96.33
The lowest
Player with choice 1 100  23 [(1 + 3)=2]= 98.66 98.66-1=97.66
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BCG+5: You choose 3 and the 4 other persons choose 0, 1, 1, and 2. The TARGETs and the
dierences to the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 20 + 23 [(0 + 1 + 1 + 2)=4] = 20.66 20.66-3 = 17.66
The lowest
Player with choice 0 20 + 23 [(1 + 1 + 2 + 3)=4] = 21.66 21.66-0=21.66
Player with choice 1 20 + 23 [(0 + 1 + 2 + 3)=4]= 21 21-1=20
Player with choice 2 20 + 23 [(0 + 1 + 1 + 3)=4]= 20.83 20.83-2=18.83
BCG 5: You choose 3 and the 4 other persons choose 0, 1, 1, and 2. The TARGETs and the
dierences to the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 100  23 [(0 + 1 + 1 + 2)=4] = 99.33 99.33-3 = 96.33
The lowest
Player with choice 0 100  23 [(1 + 1 + 2 + 3)=4] = 98.83 98.83-0=98.83
Player with choice 1 100  23 [(0 + 1 + 2 + 3)=4]= 99 99 -1 = 98
Player with choice 2 100  23 [(0 + 1 + 1 + 3)=4]= 99.16 99.16-2=97.16
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BCG+6: You choose 3 and the 5 other persons choose 0, 0, 1, 1, and 2. The TARGETs and the
dierences to the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 20 + 23 [(0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 2)=5] = 20.53 20.53-3 = 17.53
The lowest
Player with choice 0 20 + 23 [(0 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 3)=5] = 20.93 20.93-0=20.93
Player with choice 1 20 + 23 [(0 + 0 + 1 + 2 + 3)=5]= 20.8 20.8-1=19.8
Player with choice 2 20 + 23 [(0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 3)=5]= 20.66 20.66-2=18.66
BCG 6: You choose 3 and the 5 other persons choose 0, 0, 1, 1, and 2. The TARGETs and the
dierences to the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 100  23 [(0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 2)=5] = 99.46 99.46-3 = 96.46
The lowest
Player with choice 0 100  23 [(0 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 3)=5] = 99.06 99.06-0=99.06
Player with choice 1 100  23 [(0 + 0 + 1 + 2 + 3)=5]= 99.2 99.2 -1 = 98.2
Player with choice 2 100  23 [(0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 3)=5]= 99.33 99.33-2=97.33
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BCG+8: You choose 3 and all the other persons choose 1. The TARGETs and the dierences to
the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 20 + 23 [(1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1)=7] = 20.66 20.66-3 = 17.66
The lowest
Player with choice 1 20 + 23 [(1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 3)=7]= 20.85 20.85-1=19.85
BCG 8: You choose 3 and all the other persons choose 1. The TARGETs and the dierences to
the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 100  23 [(1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1)=7] = 99.33 99.33-3 = 96.33
The lowest
Player with choice 1 100  23 [(1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 3)=7]= 99.14 99.14-1=98.14
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BCG+16: You choose 3 and 7 other persons choose 1, and remaining 8 have chosen 0. The
TARGETs and the dierences to the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 20 + 23 [(7 1 + 8 0)=15] = 20.31 20.31-3 = 17.31
The lowest
Player with choice 1 20 + 23 [(6 1 + 8 0 + 3)=15]= 20.4 20.4-1=19.4
Player with choice 0 20 + 23 [(7 1 + 7 0 + 3)=15] = 20.44 20.44-0=20.44
BCG 16: You choose 3 and 7 other persons choose 1, and remaining 8 have chosen 0. The
TARGETs and the dierences to the TARGETs are:
Players TARGET Dierence to the TARGET
You (your choice: 3) 100  23 [(7 1 + 8 0)=15] = 99.68 99.68-3 = 96.68
The lowest
Player with choice 1 100  23 [(6 1 + 8 0 + 3)=15]= 99.6 99.6-1=98.6
Player with choice 0 100  23 [(7 1 + 7 0 + 3)=15] = 99.55 99.55-0=99.55
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